

SUCCESSION PLANNING IN THE STATES OF JERSEY POLICE.

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SUBMISSION TO THE EDUCATION AND HOME AFFAIRS SCRUTINY PANEL BY

GRAHAM POWER, QPM. RETIRED CHIEF OFFICER OF THE FORCE.

1. I am a retired Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police. I was appointed in November 2000 and served as Chief Officer until November 2008. I formally retired in July 2010. I joined the Police Service as a Police Cadet in 1964 and was sworn as a Police Constable in 1966. In 1974 I was selected for the "Special Course" which was the forerunner of the current High Potential Scheme. I have served in senior positions in three UK police forces and in HM Inspectorate of Constabulary. I am a graduate of the Queen's College, Oxford with a Masters Degree in Politics, Philosophy and Economics. In 1990 I was selected for, and successfully completed, the Senior Command Course at the Police Staff College, Bramshill. My career has progressed through the UK system which is intended to identify and develop high potential officers towards positions of senior command. I am now retired and live in North Yorkshire.
2. On Saturday 26th February 2011 I received correspondence from the Chairman of the Education and Home Affairs Scrutiny Panel which invited me to contribute to a review which is apparently being undertaken into Succession Planning in the States of Jersey Police. I was provided with a document which was said to be a submission made to the panel by the recent leadership of the Force. I replied to the Chairman the same day stating that I would make a submission to the panel. This document constitutes that submission. I commenced work on this document on Sunday 27th February 2011 and completed it on Sunday 6th March 2011. The document contains approximately 10,900 words. It is provided as an item of evidence to a properly constituted scrutiny panel operating under the relevant legislation. It is understood that the customary rules and immunities applicable to the scrutiny process apply to this document.
3. While every effort has been made to provide the panel with accurate and constructive information, it should be remembered that I have no access to the relevant files and records, or to former professional colleagues who may have been able to assist me with my recollection of key events. I have no research facilities and no supporting staff. It follows that almost all of what is to follow is written from memory. I am confident of my recollection of key actions and events. In some cases I am less confident of the timing of events or their sequential order. In all cases I have done the best that I can to be as accurate as possible. If there are any

inaccuracies in this submission then none are deliberate. Since I am no longer a serving officer I have not felt it appropriate to make direct recommendations to the panel. However, where I feel it to be of value, I have highlighted areas where I feel that the panel may wish to consider issues, or to undertake further research on its own behalf In particular, I have sought to draw the attention of the panel to the means by which they may be able to obtain documentary and statistical evidence which could assist in establishing the facts, independently of the opinion of any witnesses. It is entirely a matter for the panel to decide how it addresses any suggestions or comments which I have made.

4. **The political and legal framework for senior succession planning.**

The submission from the recent leadership of the Force sets out the key legislative and policy parameters within which senior appointments are made. I will not go over the same ground except where I believe that the information provided in that submission is inaccurate or is capable of a different interpretation. It is also appropriate at this stage to acknowledge that it was the relevant political leadership who effectively set the ground rules within which the Force and its police leadership operated in this area. It is not for Chief Officers to devise their own parameters for selection to senior posts. These are determined politically. It is for the Chief Officer to operate within the terms of what has been decided through the political process, with the support and endorsement of the political leadership of the time. Different political regimes may have different views at different times. That is the way of things. The Chief Officer must work within the framework set by those in political power at the relevant time. If the view of one political regime is different from that of a previous political regime, this does not mean that the previous view was wrong. It just means that views have changed. That is all.

5. The submission from the Force correctly identifies two key documents and accompanying recommendations which have informed current thinking on the criteria and qualifications for the post of Chief Officer of the Force, and to a lesser extent that of Deputy Chief Officer. The two documents to which I refer are the recommendations set out in the "Clothier One" report, and my own review, subsequently endorsed by the Home Affairs Committee, which set out the criteria in more detail. However, in the submission from the Force these documents and recommendations in the wrong sequential order. This has the effect of conveying a misleading impression of how policy and thinking has evolved over the past two decades. While the date on which my own review achieved political endorsement is correctly given as 2002, that of the Clothier report is incorrectly given as 2006. The correct date is 1996. This is important because the purpose of my review was to enlarge upon and to amplify the recommendations of the Clothier report. It was not the other way around as the force submission suggests.

6. **Members of the panel may wish to satisfy themselves that my own account of the sequence of events is accurate, and to revisit any views which they may have formed regarding the development of political thinking in respect of the qualifications and appointment of officers to the post of Chief Officer.**
7. Members may find it useful to study both documents in full. In the interests of brevity I will work on the assumption that it is accepted that the core of the political decisions made in the wake of both reports is to agree that future Chief Officers should have completed the Strategic Command Course (SCC) (or its predecessor the Senior Command Course) at the Police Staff College, having been selected through the UK Police National Assessment Centre (PNAC,) and that a local candidate should be able to demonstrate significant experience at senior level outside of the Island. The 1996 Clothier Report recommendation that this external experience should be for a minimum of five years was accepted in principle but there is room for flexibility in its application, particularly where there are a series of separate secondments of relevant value. I hope that this is a fair summary of the policy position within which I operated.
8. I will now touch briefly on the issue of qualifications for the position of Deputy Chief Officer on the basis that my own recollection and understanding of this matter is different from that expressed in the submission from the Force. I will go on to suggest that the panel takes steps of its own to clarify what appears to be conflicting understandings of the true position in relation to the qualifications required by candidates for this post.
9. Part 5 of the force submission states that completion of the Strategic Command Course *"is an essential requirement for the post of Deputy Chief Officer and Chief Officer."* In case it is suggested that there is some unintended error in this statement it can be noted that a similar assertion is made towards the end of part 4 of the submission. While the requirement for completion of the Strategic Command Course is undoubtedly a requirement for the position of Chief Officer, and is set out in the policy documents referred to earlier, there is no evidence or enclosure offered in relation to such a requirement in respect of the post of the Deputy Chief Officer. I am sure that at no time during my own service was such a requirement imposed in respect of the position of Deputy Chief Officer, nor was it ever suggested that to do so would be appropriate. Indeed, as I shall enlarge upon shortly, there were a number of well understood reasons why it was felt that such a requirement should not be imposed. On the basis of the information available to me at this time it appears that this requirement may have been inserted into the text of the Force submission in a way which does not draw attention to the apparent change in the appointment criteria. If there has in fact been a policy change since 2008 then it is a significant change and one which has a negative impact upon the succession prospects of locally qualified officers.

10. Part 8 of the Force submission sets out the view that there is no realistic prospect of a Chief Officer emerging from within the Force within the next ten years. By extending the Strategic Command Course qualification requirement to the position of Deputy Chief Officer this implies that the same timescale applies to that position also, thus putting it out of reach of local succession for the foreseeable future.
11. The political and operational view during my time as Chief Officer was that although the value of having a fully qualified officer in the position of Deputy was recognised, this had to be balanced with the realities of Island policing and the need to have local knowledge and experience at a senior level. In this context the size of the Force and the skill requirements for the post were also seen as relevant. Officers who have been through the Strategic Command Course are well trained in the development and implementation of policy and the “business management” of Police Forces. As they progress at executive level they can lose touch with direct operational issues. Given the small size of an Island Force it is appropriate to ask whether two senior officers trained and experienced at strategic level are actually needed, or whether there is greater value in the more junior of the two posts being occupied by a person with more recent front line operational experience. Value was also seen in having the Force headed by a widely experienced and professionally qualified officer, supported by a Deputy with experience, skills and contacts within the Islands wider community. I had discussed with a number of key individuals how this model may be the one which it might be appropriate to implement following my retirement.
12. I appreciate that the views I have expressed above will not be shared by all and that there will be legitimate opposing views. I agree there is scope for a fresh and well informed debate before the matter is settled. I just question whether this has happened, and if it has happened whether the panel has a record of the evidence which was considered before the decision to change the criteria for the post of Deputy Chief Officer was taken, and who took that decision. In my view this is far too an important policy change simply to be allowed to slip through unnoticed. The implications for local succession and career prospects are significant. There are also implications for the effectiveness of the Force in the unique culture and environment of the Island.
13. **The panel may wish to attempt to resolve the uncertainty which appears to exist regarding the qualification criteria for the position of Deputy Chief Officer. If the policy has recently been changed in relation to this matter, the panel may wish to establish who authorised that change, and the evidence on which that decision was based.**
14. **My own qualifications, training and experience in the selection and development of potential senior officers in the police service.**

In coming to its conclusions the panel may find that it is in possession of a number of professional views on the issue of the selection and development of future senior police officers, and that some of those views are in conflict with each other. In such circumstances it is sometimes helpful to examine the experience, qualifications and training of the different contributors to the work of the panel, prior to coming to any conclusions as to which views are the best informed and most credible. It can also sometimes be helpful to know how the skills and experience of different individuals are regarded by an independent body.

15. In order to progress this line of reasoning it is necessary to enlarge upon a matter which is touched upon briefly in part 7 of the Force submission. The submission refers to the Senior Police National Assessment Centre (PNAC) which is the process by which officers who aspire to Chief Officer Rank can be assessed by the relevant UK authorities. This competition is known as "Senior PNAC." The process which selects officers for the Graduate Entry and High Potential Schemes, to which I shall refer later, is known as "Junior PNAC." It might also be helpful for the panel to know that in the UK the terms "Chief Officer" and "Chief Officer Rank" are applied to police officers of the rank of Assistant Chief Constable or above. It does not necessarily mean that the person concerned is the head of a force. Candidates who are successful at Senior PNAC are then required to successfully complete the Strategic Command Course at the Police Staff College before becoming authorised to apply for senior positions in police services in the UK. Members of the panel may not be familiar with the PNAC system and it may therefore be helpful to briefly summarise how the process operates.
16. Candidates for Senior PNAC are typically of Chief Superintendent or substantive Superintendent rank and have significant command experience. They have the written support from their own Chief Constables. Such support is not given lightly. The credibility of the recommending Chief Constable is at stake. If candidates are not supported by their Chief Constable they cannot attend PNAC.
17. Assessment scenarios vary but in more recent years they have contained elements intended to assess generic boardroom skills in a police context. Typically candidates may be told that they are an Assistant Chief Constable in a UK force and that they have just returned from leave. In their absence a crisis has developed and other members of the executive are unavailable. They will be presented with bundles of background papers and tasks which have to be completed. These could include responding to some difficult letters and the preparation of a report to the Police Authority. They may have meetings to chair or be required to participate in meetings chaired by other candidates. They will be given short notice of the subject matter of a live television interview and seconds before they go on air they will be handed a message which significantly changes the context of the interview. They will then be subjected to a challenging interview in a real studio by a real journalist. They may then be moved quickly to another assessment module with little time to

think or to prepare. Seemingly insoluble problems, with insufficient information and challenging deadlines are a consistent feature of PNAC assessment.

18. The assessment process at PNAC takes around two and a half days. A typical assessment group would involve six candidates and three assessors. The assessment team would normally consist of two police officers and a civilian assessor. One of the police officers would chair the assessment team. He or she would typically be an experienced assessor and would usually be a Chief Constable from a UK force. The second professional assessor might be an Assistant Chief Constable or someone less experienced in the assessment process. The civilian assessor would be a person with senior level experience in business or public life. A number of retired diplomats, academics and military personnel have occupied these positions over the years. In more recent times this role has sometimes been taken by a senior and successful member of a minority group. The common factor is that all assessors will have been through a process of training and constant assessment of their capabilities in the assessment role.
19. Above the assessors is a directorate and supporting staff whose role includes "assessing the assessors." Directors and co-directors may be senior Chief Constables or Home Office representatives. They sit in on assessment exercises and observe assessor performance. They act as a form of quality control and seek to ensure consistency. The information they gather sometimes assists in marginal cases where the assessors find it hard to agree. They can also advise on the selection of assessors and identify senior officers who are suitable for the demanding role of chair of an assessment group.
20. The chair of the group is an assessor but also the leader and coordinator of the assessment team. He or she has to ensure quality assessment to tight deadlines. A chairman (or woman) might assess two candidates in addition to the chairing role. Each candidate, whether successful or otherwise, is provided with a written feedback and development report which has to be completed and signed off at the end of the two and a half days and before the next batch of candidates arrives. Feedback reports could be up to 5000 words in length and comprehensive in their analysis of performance and development needs. The chair of the group must complete his or her assessment reports and quality-control the reports of the other assessors. Decisions have to be presented at an open meeting of assessors and are subject to challenge by any other assessor or the directorate. The decisions in relation to each candidate, and the assessment reports, have to be sufficiently robust to withstand appeal and possible legal challenge. PNAC is an exhausting process for both candidates and assessors.
21. I was invited to become a PNAC assessor about 20 years ago. Following training which was conducted by the Home Office, I participated in the assessment of the junior PNAC process which selects potential candidates for the Graduate Entry and High Potential Schemes for forces in England Wales and Northern Ireland. At that

time I worked as a second police member of an assessment panel under the guidance of an experienced Chairman. During this period I was serving in the Scottish Police Service. As well as my work for the Home Office I was an assessor for the Scottish Graduate Entry and Accelerated Promotion Schemes.

22. At some stage I was invited to participate in a series of activities designed to develop new exercises for the selection process. I worked with a group of Home Office personnel and senior police officers in a number of events. I recall that one such event was over two or three days at Warwick University. I am less sure of the location of the others.
23. In the late 1990s I was invited to be an assessor for the Senior PNAC competition, working on the selection of potential future Chief Officers. For one or two years I worked occasionally as a second police member of an assessment group. I also attended further training events to develop my skills. I continued with this work after my appointment in Jersey and at some stage I was appointed as Chairman of my assessment group. I was observed and assessed in this role as part of the process which I have described earlier. Thereafter I continued to be invited to attend Senior and Junior PNAC as Chairman of an assessment group.
24. In order to balance this activity with my force responsibilities I decided to restrict my attendance at PNAC to two occasions a year. An examination of my diary for the relevant period should confirm this. In spite of making this restriction clear to the PNAC authorities my office was regularly contacted on their behalf requesting that I attend, sometimes at short notice, to undertake additional assessment work. Enquiries within the force should confirm the truth of this statement.
25. I have provided this account as evidence of the fact that I was, in the last decade of my service, a senior and active participant in the process which identifies police officers who have the potential for senior positions. At the most, only a handful of senior police officers could claim anything approaching the same level of experience and involvement in that area. I was active in the process, I was continually assessed in my performance in that process, and I was regularly invited to return to the process as Chairman of an assessment group. I believe that I am entitled to claim that I would be accepted and recognised in the relevant professional circles as one of a small number of people who could be regarded as an expert in the assessment, selection and development of future senior officers.
26. In the course of its work the panel may hear views on the subject of the identification and assessment of police officers who may be suitable for senior rank which are different from my views. Should that be the case **the panel may see value in enquiring whether any officer critical of my views has ever been selected by the relevant UK authorities to participate in the assessment of candidates for senior rank, and if they have ever participated, whether they have ever been asked to return. The panel may find such information useful in determining the relative expertise of those who may offer views on this subject.**

27. The issues which were apparent in 2000.

The panel may find it useful to have a short review of the situation as I perceived it to be in the latter part of 2000 when I took up the position of Chief Officer. Nothing which follows is intended to constitute a criticism of those who led the force before I took office. They identified some of the same issues and made such progress as was possible in the operational and political environment of that time. It is however the role of all Chief Officers to seek continuous improvement and to establish a platform on which others can build. I am grateful for the work which took place prior to 2000 much of which enabled me to take the additional steps which I felt were necessary.

28. Following my appointment I spent some time assessing the position of the Force in a number of areas and in particular in respect of leadership development. I also engaged in discussion with the political leadership of the time. From this process the following emerged as issues which needed to be addressed:

- There was a political wish to make completion of the Strategic Command Course a formal requirement for candidates for the post of Chief Officer, but there was some uncertainty as to how this could be achieved.
- There was a political acceptance of the main thrust of the “Clothier One” recommendations in respect of the position of Chief Officer but a need to develop these recommendations in sufficient detail to enable them to be implemented at a practical level. It was also felt that whatever guidelines were developed they should as far as possible be “set in stone” through formal political endorsement of a kind which may serve as a barrier to the inconsistency of approach which some felt was a characteristic of local politics.
- There was a perception, held strongly at that time by the then Vice President of the Home Affairs Committee, that the effectiveness of the force was hampered by gender discrimination. It was said that women were disadvantaged by a number of direct and indirect means. It appeared to be the case that no female officer had ever progressed beyond the rank of sergeant within the force. This contrasted with the position of one local ambitious female officer who had some years earlier transferred away from the States Police when in the rank of Constable, and by 2000 held a senior position at Chief Officer Rank in the Metropolitan Police. (She subsequently became the Chief Constable of a UK force. During her service as a Chief Officer she led on a number of national portfolios and was honoured by HM the Queen. How her career would have progressed had she remained in Jersey can only be a matter of speculation.)
- There was an equal perception that irrespective of gender, recruitment into the force was failing to capitalise on the increasing diversity of the Island’s population. Recruitment and career progression appeared to be focussed on white males of Jersey heritage. Apart from any issues of fairness and

community confidence which this situation created, it also further restricted the pool of talent to which the force had access.

- The force was not a member of the Home Office Graduate Entry or High Potential programmes which were restricted to UK forces only. This created a conflict between a local wish that the leadership of the force should have the relevant professional qualifications, and the fact that Jersey was excluded from the schemes designed to provide the first step towards obtaining those qualifications.
- Allied to the above there was a concern that in all areas of recruitment insufficient future leadership talent was being attracted into the force at entry level. The number of graduates who were joining the service was relatively low.
- The force culture was not receptive to an agenda which required ambitious police officers to move between forces, and to prove their worth in testing environments. In the UK it was effectively the rule that future Chief Officers should move between police forces and develop their skills in contrasting situations. In Jersey there was a culture of “waiting for your turn.”
- Serving officers with command potential were not convinced that the requirement for Strategic Command Course qualifications would survive changes in political leadership. They were in any event suspicious and distrustful of the process.

29. This situation created a need to address several issues at the same time. In brief, the Force had to attract the right talent, and then had to manage that talent in a way which created legitimate opportunities for ambitious officers. I will now attempt to set out the steps which were taken during the time I was serving as Chief Officer. To assist the reader I will set out some of the measures taken under separate headings. That is however not intended to suggest that they are totally separate issues. They all overlap, and each is important in supporting the other.

30. Setting the ground rules.

If local succession to the position of Chief Officer is to be a possibility, then aspiring candidates need to know what is expected of them in terms of service, performance and qualifications. These criteria need to be fixed and recorded in a way which is, so far as possible, immune from political or professional whim. I have described earlier how I took the core recommendations from “Clothier One” and set about the task of developing them into detailed guidelines which could be given political endorsement, and then used to help to form a career plan for aspiring officers. I am aware that the panel is in possession of a copy of the report which I produced.

31. The preparation of that document was more than an administrative task. It required sensitive political consultation at political and Chief Officer level across the spectrum of the public sector. There had to be a balance struck between what was ideal professionally, what could be supported politically, and what could form part of

a realistic career plan. This was not an easy exercise and much time was spent in discussions with stakeholders. In spite of the difficulties my proposals received the full endorsement of the Home Affairs Committee and became the established policy of the Islands Government. From the documents I have seen it appears that this occurred in 2002.

32. Gender issues.

It has historically been the case that most police officers are male. In 2000 all but one police officer above the rank of Constable was male. Throughout the public and private sector female managers have brought balance and fresh ideas to executive teams. Any recruitment and promotion policy which fails to capitalise on the skills of the female workforce is wasting talent and opportunity.

33. In the early part of my service in Jersey I recognised that some measures could be taken quickly and relatively easily. One early step was to encourage the return of talented female officers who had left the service for family reasons, and whose circumstances had subsequently changed. With some minor changes to existing processes we were able to offer part-time and flexible working hours and, where relevant, a return to the police service in the rank which they held at the time of their departure.

34. Another step which I was able to take using the authority of the Chief Officer alone was to reform the processes used to select officers for promotion. In doing this I introduced two principles which I had used effectively in my work on behalf of PNAC. These were independent assessors and blind marking. Following advertising and selection in accordance with the relevant rules, I was able to appoint a private company to provide independent assessment as part of the promotion process. While it would remain the case that senior police officers would mark promotion candidates on their professional skills, greater emphasis was given to generic management competencies which were assessed by the private company selected for that task. Importantly, I was able to appoint a company with previous experience in assisting the police service in the selection of high-potential candidates. As well as assessing immediate promotion potential, the company was also asked to offer views on potential for the longer term. They undertook this task entirely on the basis of generic management competencies. They were given no briefing or information on the candidates apart from their names prior to completing their assessment. These measures were intended to eliminate any bias, conscious or otherwise, which might have existed in the minds of the senior police officers who felt that they knew the candidates well.

35. The principle of blind marking was introduced for all written exercises and other forms of assessment which did not require face to face contact between assessors and candidates. Under this system candidates would be allocated a "candidate number." Typically the candidates would draw these numbers from a hat and then

write down their own name alongside the chosen number. These would then be sealed in an envelope and handed to a neutral party. The envelopes would not be opened until all assessors had completed their marking and recorded their marks. Assessors would know only the number of the candidate they was assessing. They did not know the identity of any candidate in the written tests. This process was intended to eliminate any conscious or unconscious bias on the part of senior officers who felt that they knew the candidates well, and who may have formed some previous view regarding their potential. I was also able to introduce some of these principles into the initial recruitment process.

36. All of these changes were supported by written force policies and management action which took a robust view of any sexual discrimination or harassment in the workplace. In support of this policy the force introduced a reporting line to a specialist company in the UK. The system worked on a similar basis to "Crimestoppers." Callers could ring a number and speak to a person who would not know who they were and would not be able to find out. The caller could then provide details of any harassment or related issues which they did not confidently feel could be addressed through the normal chain of command. The company would then "sanitise" the information in order to fully conceal the identity of the caller and pass it to the Deputy Chief Officer. A small number of male staff faced internal action or left the service in consequence of this policy.
37. While all of the above measures had a visible impact on the opportunities available to talented female officers I nevertheless identified a further issue which was harder to address, namely the absence of any female "role models" within the force who could mentor and encourage ambitious female staff. Because we were effectively "starting from scratch" there were no female officers who had achieved senior rank in previous years who could provide support for the current generation. I addressed this issue through a number of separate measures which taken together appeared to have a positive impact.
38. One of these measures was to separately invite two female UK Chief Constables to the Island to visit the force and engage in a number of informal meetings and discussions with staff. I saw this as valuable in both practical and symbolic terms. It was a clear demonstration that it was possible for women to reach the highest levels of the service, that the force was committed to upholding that principle, and that the work of the force in this area was being observed and supported at senior level in the UK.
39. Another practical measure related to the mentoring of an ambitious female officer. Contact was made with a UK force and it was agreed that the Jersey officer could "shadow" a senior women officer of that force. I cannot remember the length of the shadowing period but it might have been three months. This was intended to be followed by a period of continued contact and mentoring between the two officers.

40. On another occasion I used my contacts to negotiate a place for another ambitious female officer on an International Female Command Course at the Police Staff College. The course, which I think lasted for three months or possibly longer, was designed for senior women officers from overseas forces which had policing systems similar to the UK. A small number of UK officers also attended the course. The rules specified that participants should be of the rank of Superintendent or equivalent. Jersey had only one post for a Superintendent and that was occupied by a male officer. I argued that the unique circumstances of an Island force justified some flexibility in relation to the qualifying rank. After a series of exchanges this was agreed. The Jersey officer attended the course and achieved an outstanding assessment.

41. In my view all of the measures described above combined to ensure that talented officers, of whatever gender, were given a chance to progress towards their ambitions, and that the pool of talent available for future selection for senior posts was significantly enriched. Members of the panel may wish to evaluate objective evidence which may support this assertion. **It is therefore suggested that the panel consider obtaining and publishing statistics which show the number of female officers above the rank of Constable in 2000 and the equivalent number in 2008, along with details of the ranks held.**

42. Widening the recruitment base.

Underpinning the challenge of widening the recruitment base are some sensitive and complex legal and constitutional issues which the panel may wish to research separately. I am aware of some of these matters but will not attempt to set out the detail of what I know in this document. For the purposes of this paper I simply record that at the time of my appointment the way in which the Police Law and the Oath of Office were written was capable of being interpreted as excluding persons of non-UK origin from joining the force, irrespective of their local qualifications or period of residence. The consequence was that the force was turning away potential recruits many of whom were committed, well educated and ambitious. I felt that this was a concern for a number of reasons, some of which were operational. I was however specifically concerned that given an already restricted recruitment base, and the attractiveness of some salaries and conditions elsewhere in the Jersey economy, the efforts of the force to recruit good police officers and future leaders was being handicapped.

43. Given some of the sensitivities surrounding this issue I recognised the importance of political support. Fortunately, the Minister for Home Affairs at the time was strongly supportive and together we set about the task, firstly of finding out what had to be done to change this situation and then how it might be achieved. After a degree of research and advice it was established that all that was required was a small and barely noticeable change to the wording of the oath of office, although the

precise nature of the change was the subject of some sharp political exchanges. Nevertheless a form of words was agreed, and consistent with the requirements of the time, the Police Law had to be amended, firstly through the States and then the Privy Council. This proved to be a long and difficult process but, once the new arrangements were in place, the force was able to consider all recruits with the appropriate local qualification irrespective of their origin. This allowed the recruitment of a number of well educated and ambitious officers some of whom went on to win some of the prizes for which recruits are able to compete at various stages of the training process. Recruit prizes can sometimes be significant. Officers who shine at the recruit training stage often go on to emerge as candidates for senior rank in the future.

44. The panel may find it interesting to establish how many recruit training prizes have been won by officers who would have been excluded from joining the Force prior to the changes I was able to achieve to the oath of office and the criteria for appointment.

45. Graduate entry, high potential and “normal” graduate recruitment.

These are related subjects and I will therefore attempt to deal with them together. The overwhelming majority of graduate recruitment takes place outside the strict parameters of the Home Office Graduate Entry Scheme, but has a stronger relationship to that scheme than the submission from the Force may have indicated. The Graduate Entry and High Potential schemes, which are intended to identify and accelerate the progress of high potential officers, have long been recognised for their direct benefits, but also for their less obvious indirect benefits. Over the years some research, and the anecdotal views of senior officers, has suggested that the “fallout” from the Home Office Schemes may bring as much, or even greater benefit to the service than the schemes themselves. This is because the existence of a system which actively targets graduates helps to position the police service as an employer which welcomes graduate talent, and encourages recruitment enquiries from graduates and undergraduates who may not have otherwise considered a career in the police service.

46. Experience indicates that a high percentage of graduates who are attracted by the scheme but who do not make successful applications, choose to continue with a police career by the conventional route. In some cases these officers re-emerge as internal candidates for the High Potential Scheme, in other cases they progress their careers through the selection systems open to all police officers. Periodic research has indicated that officers who are “near misses” for both schemes often have careers which are as successful as those who are selected. I will describe the local experience of the Graduate Entry and High Potential Schemes in more detail shortly. The point which I am seeking to make here is that the “success” of both schemes cannot be measured by the narrow standard of how many applicants were

successful or otherwise in their attempts to achieve selection. The true test is the extent to which the existence and marketing of the schemes adds to the overall talent available to the Force. I will now seek to describe briefly how as Chief Officer I sought to maximise the “fallout” benefits presented by the Home Office schemes.

47. On taking up my appointment in November 2000 I was disappointed to learn that the Force was not a member of the Home Office Graduate Entry or High Potential Schemes but I nevertheless made it clear that I intended to pursue membership as a key objective, and that come what may the force would have some form of system which encouraged and supported the recruitment and advancement of graduates who were committed to a police career. Undergraduates and graduates were targeted at recruitment events. Serving graduate officers were asked to participate in recruitment activity and to put themselves forward as potential role models for aspiring recruits. It was also made clear that I would do all that I could to support and assist serving officers who wished to obtain a degree through part-time study.
48. **The panel may wish to assess whether my efforts to enrich the pool of potential future senior officers by means of the targeted recruitment of graduates had any measurable success. One way of doing this would be to obtain details of the number of serving officers who had degrees in November 2000 when I took office and to compare this with the number of serving graduates when I left office in November 2008. The panel may wish to publish the result of this research.**
49. I will now seek to address the difficulties which had to be overcome in order to achieve the participation of the Force in the Home Office High Potential and Graduate Entry Schemes. These schemes were separate in terms of their selection criteria. They “came together” at the training and development stages. It is understood that to date no Jersey Officer has been successful in the final stages of the selection process for these schemes. The submission by the Force states that this indicates “*a lack of structured mentoring support.*” I will return to this comment later. Meanwhile I draw the panel’s attention to the information regarding the “fallout” benefits which I have described above. I will now argue that had it not been for my considerable efforts there would have been no schemes, no candidates successful or otherwise, and no fallout benefits. To the best of my recollection the following is a fair account of my attempts to bring Jersey within the remit of this programme and thus facilitate the development and advancement of local talent.
50. Early in my term as Chief Officer I opened discussions with the Home Office regarding Jersey’s inclusion in the Graduate Entry and High Potential schemes. The approach was not well received. I recall two primary reasons for this. The first was that Jersey was not part of the UK and therefore beyond the remit of Home Office led projects. The second was that the relevant UK authorities were not convinced of the Islands commitment to deliver the advancement and career progression which the schemes envisaged. This last reservation had some merit. The “junior” schemes referred to above envisage that successful candidates will progress towards

the rank of Chief Inspector or Superintendent. In other words they “join up” with the catchment area of the senior programme which allows candidates to apply for the Strategic Command Course. Given the small number of senior ranks in the local force this means that the UK Home Office schemes might effectively be selecting one or more key members of the future senior management team of the Force. This might even apply if there was no appropriate vacancy, and it may be necessary for the force to carry a supernumerary rank in order to meet the obligations of the scheme. It is easy for this point to be missed. Local interests understandably focus on the wish that a local person should be successful in the programme. There is less awareness of the corresponding local obligation to provide development and promotion for a successful PNAC candidate even if there other local promotion candidates or there is no immediate vacancy. Membership is a two-way obligation. Jersey gains access to the benefits of the schemes but in doing so loses some local control over promotion and advancement.

51. In spite of the early setbacks I persisted with my attempts to gain entry to the schemes on behalf of the Force. I continued to be an active assessor at the junior PNAC. Those events were attended by senior UK government representatives who had influence in the scope of the programmes. Given the close and residential nature of PNAC assessment I used the opportunities provided by informal contact to pursue the Island’s case. I also took steps to improve awareness of the schemes on the part of key stakeholders in Jersey, and sought to establish a corporate memory which could carry the initiative forward. I arranged for a young but promising member of the States HR department to attend PNAC and to work alongside the Home Office team in the management of the process. I arranged for a PNAC representative to visit Jersey and make a presentation to interested elected representatives. I also arranged for invitations to attend and observe PNAC to be extended to relevant States Members. I do not recall whether these were taken up.
52. I continued with my efforts to persuade the relevant authorities to agree to the incorporation of Jersey into the scheme. I drew attention to their wider obligation to the Crown Dependencies. I also put forward the argument that officers of long Jersey heritage could claim to be a distinctive ethnic group under the jurisdiction of the Crown, and that the current stance of the Home Office could be said to be contrary to their public position on diversity issues. This latter point appeared to gain some traction at the time. For whatever reason the Home Office stance shifted and discussion moved to the terms of an agreement which might be entered into by the two governments. I assisted in the preparation of the relevant paperwork. Briefly, the Home Office was willing to include Jersey in the scheme conditional on the Jersey authorities making a corresponding commitment to deliver the legitimate entitlements of a successful candidate in respect of development and career progression. I presented the final proposals to the Home Affairs Committee and the agreement was endorsed.

53. I then worked with HR staff and others to publicise the scheme within the Force and actively identify and encourage suitable candidates to make an application. I arranged for a PNAC representative to attend the force and make a presentation to interested officers. A number of officers put their names forward. My recollection is that there may have been upwards of half a dozen candidates, and that applications were received in at least two years and possibly three.
54. The PNAC process requires that some form of sift takes place in order to reduce the number of "finalists" to a total which is manageable at the final assessment stage. So far as I recall there was one year in which the preliminary elimination stage involved a paper-sift conducted by a central body in the UK. I recall that two or three local candidates may have been eliminated by that process. I also recall that the system changed and that the initial sift was moved to Force level. When this was done it was emphasised that only candidates with a serious chance of success should be sent to the next stage.
55. I recall that I was engaged in the initial assessment of three or four local candidates as part of that process. The local assessment consisted of "blind marked" written exercises, ability tests, a presentation and a panel interview. I recall that none of the candidates progressed beyond the Force selection stage but at least one and possibly two or three were identified as showing promise and encouraged to re-apply following further development. I provided all applicants with comprehensive written feedback and development advice. These documents should still be on file.
56. I now return to the assertion made in the Force submission that the outcomes I have described above indicate *"a lack of structured mentoring support."* The panel may agree that this implied criticism may be usefully viewed in the context of the probability of the Force gaining a place on the scheme, given the small number of local candidates and the rigours of the selection process. Or to put it another way, does the lack of initial progress by a handful of candidates constitute a failure to achieve something which should have been achieved? or was it the most probable outcome in the circumstances? Unlike some other issues which may be in contention, this is a matter which is to a large extent capable of being addressed by simple arithmetic. The key question appears to be "what is the statistical probability of a member of the States of Jersey Police obtaining a place on the High Potential/Graduate Entry Schemes?" This probability could be expressed in a number of ways. One way could be a statement along the lines of "assuming that the Force has a relative success rate equivalent to that of a UK force it will have one successful candidate every X years." The value of X could be calculated using available data. This would include the average total number of successful candidates per year (I believe that this is around 50 but the panel may wish to check this figure.) Other relevant data includes the total number of officers in all of the police services in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the number of police officers

in Jersey and the size of the Force expressed as a percentage of the total number of officers falling within the catchment area of the scheme.

57. **The panel may wish to calculate the statistical probability of a Jersey officer obtaining a place on the Home Office High Potential/Graduate Entry Scheme along the lines stated above. This may enable the panel to conclude whether the progress made by local candidates to date constitutes a matter of concern and whether the claim that the outcomes to date are a consequence of “a lack of structured mentoring and support” is a valid, evidence-based statement worthy of a senior police officer.**

58. **Experience and development outside Jersey.**

Earlier in this paper I referred to the Clothier recommendation, which was subsequently endorsed by the Home Affairs Committee, that development towards senior positions in the Force should involve policing experience outside of the Island. I will therefore attempt to set out the steps which I took as Chief Officer to help aspiring officers to meet this requirement. To begin with it is fair to acknowledge that on my appointment I was able to establish that there was a history of some developmental secondments having taken place in the past. These had been occasional and had made use of the professional network of my predecessor. There is nothing wrong with valuable secondments being arranged on such a basis. It could in fact be argued that it is the only way in which satisfactory external development can be achieved. So far as I am aware there is no police force or body in the UK which has as part of its formal remit an obligation to assist the States of Jersey Police. If the Chief Officer does not have a network of connections which can be used to provide for professional development and related issues then the Force is quite literally “on its own.” Managing a small force such as the States of Jersey Police, in which staff know each other by name, does not necessarily require bundles of plans and strategic documents which state what everyone knows already. Sometimes it is enough just to “get on with it.” My predecessor got on with it and I got on with it.

59. I did however think that as my planned use of secondments became more of a feature of the professional development of those who aspired to more senior rank, it would be appropriate to seek political ownership, and that this required a written plan. It was by this means that the “Leadership Development Programme” came into being. This programme was aimed at relatively young but ambitious officers who welcomed a chance to improve on their experience by working in a busy UK force. It was aimed at the development of future managers rather than existing managers. I will describe later some of the steps which were taken to enhance the skills of more senior officers.

60. Before taking the matter to the Home Affairs Committee (or the Minister, I am not sure which) I had “lined up” a number of potential secondments with the agreement

of some Chief Constables of UK forces. Once the scheme had gained political endorsement the opportunities were advertised internally and ambitious officers were invited to apply. There was a competitive selection process before the chosen officers were nominated. A number of candidates applied for the programme and those who were selected completed their secondments. As part of the arrangement they were tasked with producing a paper on lessons learned which might be of benefit to the Force. They were also assessed by the host force on their performance during the secondment. In all cases the assessments were positive. The panel may agree that this is a further example of pro-active management of the development of ambitious officers and the creation of opportunities for those who had the motivation to seize them.

61. It may be of interest to the panel to know that there were additional operational benefits to the Force from the programme. Officers were encouraged to make and sustain operational contacts which might benefit the security of the Island in the future. My attention was recently drawn to a Jersey media report. The report spoke of a successful operation against attempted drug importation by an organised criminal group from the Glasgow area. The report said that the operation had been conducted in partnership with Strathclyde Police. It named the Jersey officer who had taken the lead. The officer was one who had participated in the Leadership Development Programme. His secondment had been to the Strathclyde Drug Squad.
62. The number of senior officers in the Force is small. A formalised "programme" targeted on a handful of individuals who work closely together may be bureaucratic overkill. That does not mean that I was not active in the development of more senior ranking officers. Without access to the appropriate files and records I can only give some accounts from memory. There will be other examples which I am not able to recall at this time.
63. One example followed a successful criminal investigation involving the American Authorities. During the investigation contacts were made and I was invited to the American Embassy for an informal meeting with senior FBI personnel. During those discussions I was offered a place on a Senior Officers training programme at the FBI Academy. I recall expressing some reservations due to the fact that I was not far from retirement, and the benefit to the Force was therefore questionable. The invitation was later confirmed in a letter sent to my office. It invited me or a nominee to attend. I decided to offer the opportunity to a serving Jersey-born officer who at that time was third in command of the Force and who had indicated that he had ambitions to progress further. The terms of the offer provided for all of the costs of the training to be met by the American Authorities. Jersey was asked to bear travel and related costs. I prepared a bid to the relevant political body (either the Home Affairs Committee or the Minister) which was approved. The officer

attended the FBI Academy as planned and received a positive report. There should be documents on file which confirm these events.

64. Another example related to a member of the Senior Management Team who had achieved a senior rank relatively early in his service. During one of our periodic career development discussions he raised the possibility of an external secondment which would help him develop as a potential candidate for the Strategic Command Course. I was aware of an opportunity with HM Inspectorate of Constabulary in the UK who were looking for a promising officer to assist the Inspectorate with a major review of UK forces. There was a problem in that the vacancy was advertised for an officer of a rank which was above the rank of the officer concerned. I asked him to leave it with me. I produced proposals for consideration by the Minister. These included a commitment to promote the officer to the next rank on a temporary basis should he be selected for the vacancy. Once these arrangements were confirmed the application was submitted to the Inspectorate and the Jersey candidate was successful. It is my recollection that the secondment was extended beyond the original term at the request of HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and may have lasted for over a year. There will be documents on file which confirm this series of events.
65. There were a number of other external development and training opportunities which I arranged on behalf of aspiring senior officers in order to give them a fair chance to fulfil their ambitions. Without access to the relevant files and records I cannot give further details.

66. **Preparation for the Strategic Command Course.**

Any useful discussion of issue of Jersey Officers emerging as successful candidates for the Strategic Command Course has to be founded in reality. To be eligible to apply an officer must be of Chief Superintendent or substantive Superintendent Rank. During my service the force did not have a post of Chief Superintendent and there was only one Superintendent. Effectively therefore, at any one time, there would only be one serving officer who would be eligible to apply for selection for the SCC, and as long as that officer was in post no other person could apply. I discussed this informally with relevant politicians from time to time. As a result of these discussions we had an informal "plan" to deal with a situation in which an officer below the rank of Superintendent appeared to be a promising candidate for SCC selection. This would involve a temporary promotion to Superintendent and an approach to the PNAC authorities asking them to show flexibility in the eligibility criteria. As things happened the situation did not arise and this intention was never formalised.

67. The preparation required from a potential candidate for SCC has varied over the years. During the later years of my service there was an expectation that candidates would complete a number of training modules prior to making an application. There was a UK body which supported and advised officers in meeting this

requirement. I met with the relevant body (the name of which I cannot recall) and provided local officers with contact details. I remember that I supported two members of the management team who completed some of these preparatory modules.

68. Other measures were taken to support and assist local officers who had an interest in SCC. One of these involved seeking to dispel the mystery and distrust with which some officers felt towards the senior PNAC process. I addressed this in a number of ways. The introduction of objective tests, independent assessment and “blind marking” into the customary processes of the Force, described earlier, was one of these measures. However, when a vacancy arose for a Superintendent, and there were four local candidates, a further opportunity arose. Following consultation with the then Minister for Home Affairs it was agreed that the selection process would be as close to the PNAC model as possible. I therefore engaged the services of a distinguished former Chief Constable who was a long-serving PNAC assessor. An application was then made to the PNAC authorities for permission to use actual PNAC exercises from previous years. This was granted and a local “PNAC” assessment programme was put together for the four candidates to undertake. The independent PNAC assessor led on the marking of the PNAC exercises.
69. By this process candidates had the experience of PNAC assessment and were also able to benchmark their performance against the PNAC standard. The process identified one officer who did not demonstrate potential for the next rank on that occasion, one who showed early promise but required further development, one who narrowly met the standard for promotion and one who emerged as reaching the standard for promotion and being the strongest of the group. The latter officer was subsequently promoted. In terms of benchmarking against the PNAC standard no officers clearly reached the standard required for SCC selection but two showed abilities which could enable them to reach the standard at a future date. I provided all candidates with comprehensive written feedback and development advice. All of these documents should still be on file. I offer this account as a further example of the actions taken to prepare and encourage local officers who had the potential and motivation for Senior Command.

70. **Other development issues.**

As part of the normal business of the Force, opportunities were taken to develop promising officers. This was not a separate agenda. It was an intrinsic part of the management of the organisation. I will mention two aspects of this mainstream work by way of example. The first relates to the role of Staff Officer to the Chief Officer. In 2000 I found this position to be largely administrative in its content. At some time in 2001 the post became vacant. I saw this as a chance to re-shape the position into a training and development opportunity for ambitious and promising officers. The post was re-defined in a way which allowed the holder of the post to

effectively “shadow” the Chief Officer and the Deputy. The Staff Officer would attend strategic meetings, engage in senior management discussions, draft policy papers, attend meetings with Ministers and other senior figures and undertake further work which would provide familiarity with the skills and functions of senior command. The position was advertised and candidates competed for the role through an assessment process which included written tests and the “blind marking” referred to earlier.


71. Panel members may find interest in identifying the officers who were appointed by me to the position of Staff Officer and in obtaining details of their academic and other qualifications, their length of service and their career progression subsequent to leaving the post.

72. The second area was in the selection of officers to undertake advanced professional training as opportunities arose. Ideally, everyone should receive all of the training they reasonably wish for. In the real world of restricted budgets that is not possible. I note that the Force submission to the panel identifies the need for further developmental training in a way which can be interpreted as a thinly disguised resource bid. While this may be worth a try it might also be unrealistic. The same money cannot be spent twice. During my time as Chief Officer significant training opportunities were routinely discussed at the daily morning meetings. It was always understood that the limited budget available should be prioritised in favour of officers with longer term potential. This meant that some other officers who may have reached the limits of their potential, myself included, did not get the same opportunities. A fair assessment of the records will confirm that where possible, training funds were prioritised in the way I have described.

73. Political ownership and endorsement.

I described earlier in this paper how I accept and endorse the principle that the Chief Officer should operate within the parameters set by the relevant political leadership. The panel may therefore wish to know whether the measures I took during my period as Chief Officer to enlarge the pool of potential senior officers in the force had the support and endorsement of the Minister for Home Affairs. I can state without equivocation that the Minister was regularly briefed on the measures which were being taken and gave her complete support and endorsement. She was at times fulsome in her praise both verbally and in writing. I do not have access to the relevant files but I am aware that in one document received in 2006 she said *“it is heartening to see such highly qualified individuals joining SoJP. It speaks well for the regard in which the Force is held. This, I believe, has been largely due to your influence since you became Chief and will, I hope be a lasting testament to your leadership.”*

74. It is accepted that political views change and that one political regime may have a different view from its predecessor. That is simply a fact about politics. It does not entitle anyone to re-write history.
75. I hope that the Scrutiny Panel finds this document helpful in assessing the measures taken to support succession planning in the force between 2000 and 2008.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Graham Power". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping flourish at the end of the word "Power". Below the signature is a horizontal dotted line.

Graham Power.

6th March 2011.